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Quantum mechanics is generally regarded as the physical
theory that is our best candidate for a fundamental and
universal description of the physical world. The conceptual
framework employed by this theory differs drastically from
that of classical physics. Indeed, the transition from classical
to quantum physics marks a genuine revolution in our
understanding of the physical world.
One striking aspect of the difference between classical and
quantum physics is that whereas classical mechanics
presupposes that exact simultaneous values can be assigned
to all physical quantities, quantum mechanics denies this
possibility, the prime example being the position and
momentum of a particle. According to quantum mechanics,
the more precisely the position (momentum) of a particle is
given, the less precisely can one say what its momentum
(position) is. This is (a simplistic and preliminary formulation
of) the quantum mechanical uncertainty principle for position
and momentum. The uncertainty principle played an
important role in many discussions on the philosophical
implications of quantum mechanics, in particular in
discussions on the consistency of the so-called Copenhagen
interpretation, the interpretation endorsed by the founding
fathers Heisenberg and Bohr.
This should not suggest that the uncertainty principle is the
only aspect of the conceptual difference between classical
and quantum physics: the implications of quantum mechanics
for notions as (non)-locality, entanglement and identity play
no less havoc with classical intuitions.

1. Introduction
The uncertainty principle is certainly one of the most famous
and important aspects of quantum mechanics. It has often
been regarded as the most distinctive feature in which
quantum mechanics differs from classical theories of the
physical world. Roughly speaking, the uncertainty principle
(for position and momentum) states that one cannot assign
exact simultaneous values to the position and momentum of a
physical system. Rather, these quantities can only be
determined with some characteristic ‘uncertainties’ that
cannot become arbitrarily small simultaneously. But what is
the exact meaning of this principle, and indeed, is it really a
principle of quantum mechanics? (In his original work,
Heisenberg only speaks of uncertainty relations.) And, in
particular, what does it mean to say that a quantity is
determined only up to some uncertainty? These are the main
questions we will explore in the following, focusssing on the
views of Heisenberg and Bohr.
The notion of ‘uncertainty’ occurs in several different
meanings in the physical literature. It may refer to a lack of
knowledge of a quantity by an observer, or to the
experimental inaccuracy with which a quantity is measured,
or to some ambiguity in the definition of a quantity, or to a
statistical spread in an ensemble of similary prepared
systems. Also, several different names are used for such
uncertainties: inaccuracy, spread, imprecision, indefiniteness,
indeterminateness, indeterminacy, latitude, etc. As we shall
see, even Heisenberg and Bohr did not decide on a single
terminology for quantum mechanical uncertainties.

Forestalling a discussion about which name is the most
appropriate one in quantum mechanics, we use the name
‘uncertainty principle’ imply because it is the most common
one in the literature.
2. Heisenberg
2.1 Heisenberg's road to the uncertainty relations
Heisenberg introduced his now famous relations in an article
of 1927, entitled "Ueber den anschaulichen Inhalt der
quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik". A (partial)
translation of this title is: "On the anschaulich content of
quantum theoretical kinematics and mechanics". Here, the
term anschaulich is particularly notable. Apparently, it is one
of those German words that defy an unambiguous translation
into other languages. Heisenberg's title is translated as "On
the physical content …" by Wheeler and Zurek (1983). His
collected works (Heisenberg, 1984) translate it as "On the
perceptible content …", while Cassidy's biography of
Heisenberg (Cassidy, 1992), refers to the paper as "On the
perceptual content …". Literally, the closest translation of
the term anschaulich is ‘visualizable’. But, as in most
languages, words that make reference to vision are not
always intended literally. Seeing is widely used as a
metaphor for understanding, especially for immediate
understanding. Hence, anschaulich also means ‘intelligible’
or ‘intuitive’.[1]
Why was this issue of the Anschaulichkeit of quantum
mechanics such a prominent concern to Heisenberg? This
question has already been considered by a number of

commentators (Jammer, 1977; Miller 1982; de Regt, 1997;
Beller, 1999). For the answer, it turns out, we must go back a
little in time. In 1925 Heisenberg had developed the first
coherent mathematical formalism for quantum
theory (Heisenberg, 1925). His leading idea was that only
those quantities that are in principle observable should play a
role in the theory, and that all attempts to form a picture of
what goes on inside the atom should be avoided. In atomic
physics the observational data were obtained from
spectroscopy and associated with atomic transitions. Thus,
Heisenberg was led to consider the ‘transition quantities’ as
the basic ingredients of the theory. Max Born, later that year,
realized that the transition quantities obeyed the rules of
matrix calculus, a branch of mathematics that was not so
well-known then as it is now. In a famous series of papers
Heisenberg, Born and Jordan developed this idea into the
matrix mechanics version of quantum theory.
Formally, matrix mechanics remains close to classical
mechanics. The central idea is that all physical quantities
must be represented by infinite self-adjoint matrices (later
identified with operators on a Hilbert space). It is postulated
that the matrices q and p representing the canonical position
and momentum variables of a particle satisfy the so-called
canonical commutation rule
qp − pq = i
where = h/2π, h denotes Planck's constant, and boldface
type is used to represent matrices. The new theory scored
spectacular empirical success by encompassing nearly all

(1)

spectroscopic data known at the time, especially after the
concept of the electron spin was included in the theoretical
framework.
It came as a big surprise, therefore, when one year later,
Erwin Schrödinger presented an alternative theory, that
became known as wave mechanics. Schrödinger assumed
that an electron in an atom could be represented as an
oscillating charge cloud, evolving continuously in space and
time according to a wave equation. The discrete frequencies
in the atomic spectra were not due to discontinuous
transitions (quantum jumps) as in matrix mechanics, but to a
resonance phenomenon. Schrödinger also showed that the
two theories were equivalent.[2]
Even so, the two approaches differed greatly in interpretation
and spirit. Whereas Heisenberg eschewed the use of
visualizable pictures, and accepted discontinuous transitions
as a primitive notion, Schrödinger claimed as an advantage of
his theory that it was anschaulich. In Schrödinger's
vocabulary, this meant that the theory represented the
observational data by means of continuously evolving causal
processes in space and time. He considered this condition of
Anschaulichkeit to be an essential requirement on any
acceptable physical theory. Schrödinger was not alone in
appreciating this aspect of his theory. Many other leading
physicists were attracted to wave mechanics for the same
reason. For a while, in 1926, before it emerged that wave
mechanics had serious problems of its own, Schrödinger's
approach seemed to gather more support in the physics
community than matrix mechanics.

Understandably, Heisenberg was unhappy about this
development. In a letter of 8 June 1926 to Pauli he confessed
that "The more I think about the physical part of
Schrödinger's theory, the more disgusting I find it", and:
"What Schrödinger writes about the Anschaulichkeit of his
theory, … I consider Mist (Pauli, 1979, p. 328)". Again, this
last German term is translated differently by various
commentators: as "junk" (Miller, 1982) "rubbish" (Beller
1999) "crap" (Cassidy, 1992), and perhaps more literally, as
"bullshit" (de Regt, 1997). Nevertheless, in published
writings, Heisenberg voiced a more balanced opinion. In a
paper in Die Naturwissenschaften (1926) he summarized the
peculiar situation that the simultaneous development of two
competing theories had brought about. Although he argued
that Schrödinger's interpretation was untenable, he admitted
that matrix mechanics did not provide the Anschaulichkeit
which made wave mechanics so attractive. He concluded: "to
obtain a contradiction-free anschaulich interpretation, we still
lack some essential feature in our image of the structure of
matter". The purpose of his 1927 paper was to provide
exactly this lacking feature.
2.2 Heisenberg's argument
Let us now look at the argument that led Heisenberg to his
uncertainty relations. He started by redefining the notion of
Anschaulichkeit. Whereas Schrödinger associated this term
with the provision of a causal space-time picture of the
phenomena, Heisenberg, by contrast, declared:
We believe we have gained anschaulich understanding of a
physical theory, if in all simple cases, we can grasp the

experimental consequences qualitatively and see that the
theory does not lead to any contradictions. Heisenberg, 1927,
p. 172)
His goal was, of course, to show that, in this new sense of the
word, matrix mechanics could lay the same claim to
Anschaulichkeit as wave mechanics.
To do this, he adopted an operational assumption: terms like
‘the position of a particle’ have meaning only if one specifies
a suitable experiment by which ‘the position of a particle’
can be measured. We will call this assumption the
‘measurement=meaning principle’. In general, there is no
lack of such experiments, even in the domain of atomic
physics. However, experiments are never completely
accurate. We should be prepared to accept, therefore, that in
general the meaning of these quantities is also determined
only up to some characteristic inaccuracy.
As an example, he considered the measurement of the
position of an electron by a microscope. The accuracy of
such a measurement is limited by the wave length of the light
illuminating the electron. Thus, it is possible, in principle, to
make such a position measurement as accurate as one wishes,
by using light of a very short wave length, e.g., γ-rays. But
for γ-rays, the Compton effect cannot be ignored: the
interaction of the electron and the illuminating light should
then be considered as a collision of at least one photon with
the electron. In such a collision, the electron suffers a recoil
which disturbs its momentum. Moreover, the shorter the
wave length, the larger is this change in momentum. Thus, at
the moment when the position of the particle is accurately

known, Heisenberg argued, its momentum cannot be
accurately known:
At the instant of time when the position is determined, that is,
at the instant when the photon is scattered by the electron, the
electron undergoes a discontinuous change in momentum.
This change is the greater the smaller the wavelength of the
light employed, i.e., the more exact the determination of the
position. At the instant at which the position of the electron is
known, its momentum therefore can be known only up to
magnitudes which correspond to that discontinuous change;
thus, the more precisely the position is determined, the less
precisely the momentum is known, and conversely
(Heisenberg, 1927, p. 174-5).
This is the first formulation of the uncertainty principle. In its
present form it is an epistemological principle, since it limits
what we can know about the electron. From "elementary
formulae of the Compton effect" Heisenberg estimated the
‘imprecisions’ to be of the order
δpδq ∼ h

(2)

He continued: “In this circumstance we see the direct
anschaulich content of the relation qp − pq = i .”
He went on to consider other experiments, designed to
measure other physical quantities and obtained analogous
relations for time and energy:
δt δE ∼ h

(3)

and action J and angle w
δw δJ ∼ h

(4)

which he saw as corresponding to the "well-known" relations
tE − Et = i

or

wJ − Jw = i

(5)

However, these generalisations are not as straightforward as
Heisenberg suggested. In particular, the status of the time
variable in his several illustrations of relation (3) is not at all
clear (Hilgevoord 2005).
Heisenberg summarized his findings in a general conclusion:
all concepts used in classical mechanics are also well-defined
in the realm of atomic processes. But, as a pure fact of
experience ("rein erfahrungsgemäß"), experiments that serve
to provide such a definition for one quantity are subject to
particular indeterminacies, obeying relations (2)-(4) which
prohibit them from providing a simultaneous definition of
two canonically conjugate quantities. Note that in this
formulation the emphasis has slightly shifted: he now speaks
of a limit on the definition of concepts, i.e. not merely on
what we can know, but what we can meaningfully say about a
particle. Of course, this stronger formulation follows by
application of the above measurement=meaning principle: if
there are, as Heisenberg claims, no experiments that allow a
simultaneous precise measurement of two conjugate
quantities, then these quantities are also not simultaneously
well-defined.

Heisenberg's paper has an interesting "Addition in proof"
mentioning critical remarks by Bohr, who saw the paper only
after it had been sent to the publisher. Among other things,
Bohr pointed out that in the microscope experiment it is not
the change of the momentum of the electron that is important,
but rather the circumstance that this change cannot be
precisely determined in the same experiment. An improved
version of the argument, responding to this objection, is
given in Heisenberg's Chicago lectures of 1930.
Here (Heisenberg, 1930, p. 16), it is assumed that the
electron is illuminated by light of wavelength λ and that the
scattered light enters a microscope with aperture angle ε.
According to the laws of classical optics, the accuracy of the
microscope depends on both the wave length and the aperture
angle; Abbe's criterium for its ‘resolving power’, i.e. the size
of the smallest discernable details, gives
δq ∼ λ/sin ε

(6)

On the other hand, the direction of a scattered photon, when
it enters the microscope, is unknown within the angle ε,
rendering the momentum change of the electron uncertain by
an amount
δp ∼ h sin ε/λ
leading again to the result (2).
Let us now analyse Heisenberg's argument in more detail.
First note that, even in this improved version, Heisenberg's
argument is incomplete. According to Heisenberg's

(7)

‘measurement=meaning principle’, one must also specify, in
the given context, what the meaning is of the phrase
‘momentum of the electron’, in order to make sense of the
claim that this momentum is changed by the position
measurement. A solution to this problem can again be found
in the Chicago lectures (Heisenberg, 1930, p. 15). Here, he
assumes that initially the momentum of the electron is
precisely known, e.g. it has been measured in a previous
experiment with an inaccuracy δpi, which may be arbitrarily
small. Then, its position is measured with inaccuracy δq, and
after this, its final momentum is measured with an inaccuracy
δpf. All three measurements can be performed with arbitrary
precision. Thus, the three quantities δpi, δq, and δpf can be
made as small as one wishes. If we assume further that the
initial momentum has not changed until the position
measurement, we can speak of a definite momentum until the
time of the position measurement. Moreover we can give
operational meaning to the idea that the momentum is
changed during the position measurement: the outcome of the
second momentum measurement (say pf) will generally differ
from the initial value pi. In fact, one can also show that this
change is discontinuous, by varying the time between the
three measurements.
Let us now try to see, adopting this more elaborate set-up, if
we can complete Heisenberg's argument. We have now been
able to give empirical meaning to the ‘change of momentum’
of the electron, pf − pi. Heisenberg's argument claims that the
order of magnitude of this change is at least inversely
proportional to the inaccuracy of the position measurement:

| pf − pi | δq ∼ h

(8)

However, can we now draw the conclusion that the
momentum is only imprecisely defined? Certainly not.
Before the position measurement, its value was pi, after the
measurement it is pf. One might, perhaps, claim that the value
at the very instant of the position measurement is not yet
defined, but we could simply settle this by an assignment by
convention, e.g., we might assign the mean value (pi + pf)/2
to the momentum at this instant. But then, the momentum is
precisely determined at all instants, and Heisenberg's
formulation of the uncertainty principle no longer follows.
The above attempt of completing Heisenberg's argument thus
overshoots its mark.
A solution to this problem can again be found in the Chicago
Lectures. Heisenberg admits that position and momentum
can be known exactly. He writes:
If the velocity of the electron is at first known, and the
position then exactly measured, the position of the electron
for times previous to the position measurement may be
calculated. For these past times, δpδq is smaller than the
usual bound. (Heisenberg 1930, p. 15)
Indeed, Heisenberg says: "the uncertainty relation does not
hold for the past".
Apparently, when Heisenberg refers to the uncertainty or
imprecision of a quantity, he means that the value of this
quantity cannot be given beforehand. In the sequence of
measurements we have considered above, the uncertainty in

the momentum after the measurement of position has
occurred, refers to the idea that the value of the momentum is
not fixed just before the final momentum measurement takes
place. Once this measurement is performed, and reveals a
value pf, the uncertainty relation no longer holds; these values
then belong to the past. Clearly, then, Heisenberg is
concerned with unpredictability: the point is not that the
momentum of a particle changes, due to a position
measurement, but rather that it changes by an unpredictable
amount. It is, however always possible to measure, and hence
define, the size of this change in a subsequent measurement
of the final momentum with arbitrary precision.
Although Heisenberg admits that we can consistently
attribute values of momentum and position to an electron in
the past, he sees little merit in such talk. He points out that
these values can never be used as initial conditions in a
prediction about the future behavior of the electron, or
subjected to experimental verification. Whether or not we
grant them physical reality is, as he puts it, a matter of
personal taste. Heisenberg's own taste is, of course, to deny
their physical reality. For example, he writes, "I believe that
one can formulate the emergence of the classical ‘path’ of a
particle pregnantly as follows: the ‘path’ comes into being
only because we observe it" (Heisenberg, 1927, p. 185).
Apparently, in his view, a measurement does not only serve
to give meaning to a quantity, it creates a particular value for
this quantity. This may be called the ‘measurement=creation’
principle. It is an ontological principle, for it states what is
physically real.

This then leads to the following picture. First we measure the
momentum of the electron very accurately. By
‘measurement= meaning’, this entails that the term "the
momentum of the particle" is now well-defined. Moreover,
by the ‘measurement=creation’ principle, we may say that
this momentum is physically real. Next, the position is
measured with inaccuracy δq. At this instant, the position of
the particle becomes well-defined and, again, one can regard
this as a physically real attribute of the particle. However, the
momentum has now changed by an amount that is
unpredictable by an order of magnitude | pf − pi | ∼ h/δq. The
meaning and validity of this claim can be verified by a
subsequent momentum measurement.
The question is then what status we shall assign to the
momentum of the electron just before its final measurement.
Is it real? According to Heisenberg it is not. Before the final
measurement, the best we can attribute to the electron is
some unsharp, or fuzzy momentum. These terms are meant
here in an ontological sense, characterizing a real attribute of
the electron.
2.3 The interpretation of Heisenberg's relation
The relations Heisenberg had proposed were soon considered
to be a cornerstone of the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Just a few months later, Kennard (1927)
already called them the "essential core" of the new theory.
Taken together with Heisenberg's contention that they
provided the intuitive content of the theory and their
prominent role in later discussions on the Copenhagen
interpretation, a dominant view emerged in which the

uncertainty relations were regarded as a fundamental
principle of the theory.
The interpretation of these relations has often been debated.
Do Heisenberg's relations express restrictions on the
experiments we can perform on quantum systems, and,
therefore, restrictions on the information we can gather about
such systems; or do they express restrictions on the meaning
of the concepts we use to describe quantum systems? Or else,
are they restrictions of an ontological nature, i.e., do they
assert that a quantum system simply does not possess a
definite value for its position and momentum at the same
time? The difference between these interpretations is partly
reflected in the various names by which the relations are
known, e.g. as ‘inaccuracy relations’, or: ‘uncertainty’,
‘indeterminacy’ or ‘unsharpness relations’. The debate
between these different views has been addressed by many
authors, but it has never been settled completely. Let it
suffice here to make only two general observations.
First, it is clear that in Heisenberg's own view all the above
questions stand or fall together. Indeed, we have seen that he
adopted an operational "measurement=meaning" principle
according to which the meaningfulness of a physical quantity
was equivalent to the existence of an experiment purporting
to measure that quantity. Similarly, his
"measurement=creation" principle allowed him to attribute
physical reality to such quantities. Hence, Heisenberg's
discussions moved rather freely and quickly from talk about
experimental inaccuracies to epistemological or ontological
issues and back again.

However, ontological questions seemed to be of somewhat
less interest to him. For example, there is a passage
(Heisenberg, 1927, p. 197), where he discusses the idea that,
behind our observational data, there might still exist a hidden
reality in which quantum systems have definite values for
position and momentum, unaffected by the uncertainty
relations. He emphatically dismisses this conception as an
unfruitful and meaningless speculation, because, as he says,
the aim of physics is only to describe observable data.
Similarly, in the Chicago Lectures (Heisenberg 1930, p. 11),
he warns against the fact that the human language permits the
utterance of statements which have no empirical content at
all, but nevertheless produce a picture in our imagination. He
notes, "One should be especially careful in using the words
‘reality’, ‘actually’, etc., since these words very often lead to
statements of the type just mentioned." So, Heisenberg also
endorsed an interpretation of his relations as rejecting a
reality in which particles have simultaneous definite values
for position and momentum.
The second observation is that although for Heisenberg
experimental, informational, epistemological and ontological
formulations of his relations were, so to say, just different
sides of the same coin, this is not so for those who do not
share his operational principles or his view on the task of
physics. Alternative points of view, in which e.g. the
ontological reading of the uncertainty relations is denied, are
therefore still viable. The statement, often found in the
literature of the thirties, that Heisenberg had proved the
impossibility of associating a definite position and
momentum to a particle is certainly wrong. But the precise

meaning one can coherently attach to Heisenberg's relations
depends rather heavily on the interpretation one favors for
quantum mechanics as a whole. And because no agreement
has been reached on this latter issue, one cannot expect
agreement on the meaning of the uncertainty relations either.
2.4 Uncertainty relations or uncertainty principle?
Let us now move to another question about Heisenberg's
relations: do they express a principle of quantum theory?
Probably the first influential author to call these relations a
‘principle’ was Eddington, who, in his Gifford Lectures of
1928 referred to them as the ‘Principle of Indeterminacy’. In
the English literature the name uncertainty principle became
most common. It is used both by Condon and Robertson in
1929, and also in the English version of Heisenberg's
Chicago Lectures (Heisenberg, 1930), although, remarkably,
nowhere in the original German version of the same book
(see also Cassidy, 1998). Indeed, Heisenberg never seems to
have endorsed the name ‘principle’ for his relations. His
favourite terminology was ‘inaccuracy relations’
(Ungenauigkeitsrelationen) or ‘indeterminacy relations’
(Unbestimmtheitsrelationen). We know only one passage, in
Heisenberg's own Gifford lectures, delivered in 1955-56
(Heisenberg, 1958, p. 43), where he mentioned that his
relations "are usually called relations of uncertainty or
principle of indeterminacy". But this can well be read as his
yielding to common practice rather than his own preference.
But does the relation (2) qualify as a principle of quantum
mechanics? Several authors, foremost Karl Popper (1967),
have contested this view. Popper argued that the uncertainty

relations cannot be granted the status of a principle on the
grounds that they are derivable from the theory, whereas one
cannot obtain the theory from the uncertainty relations. (The
argument being that one can never derive any equation, say,
the Schrödinger equation, or the commutation relation (1),
from an inequality.)
Popper's argument is, of course, correct but we think it
misses the point. There are many statements in physical
theories which are called principles even though they are in
fact derivable from other statements in the theory in question.
A more appropriate departing point for this issue is not the
question of logical priority but rather Einstein's distinction
between ‘constructive theories’ and ‘principle theories’.
Einstein proposed this famous classification in (Einstein,
1919). Constructive theories are theories which postulate the
existence of simple entities behind the phenomena. They
endeavour to reconstruct the phenomena by framing
hypotheses about these entities. Principle theories, on the
other hand, start from empirical principles, i.e. general
statements of empirical regularities, employing no or only a
bare minimum of theoretical terms. The purpose is to build
up the theory from such principles. That is, one aims to show
how these empirical principles provide sufficient conditions
for the introduction of further theoretical concepts and
structure.
The prime example of a theory of principle is
thermodynamics. Here the role of the empirical principles is
played by the statements of the impossibility of various kinds
of perpetual motion machines. These are regarded as

expressions of brute empirical fact, providing the appropriate
conditions for the introduction of the concepts of energy and
entropy and their properties. (There is a lot to be said about
the tenability of this view, but that is not the topic of this
entry.)
Now obviously, once the formal thermodynamic theory is
built, one can also derive the impossibility of the various
kinds of perpetual motion. (They would violate the laws of
energy conservation and entropy increase.) But this
derivation should not misguide one into thinking that they
were no principles of the theory after all. The point is just
that empirical principles are statements that do not rely on the
theoretical concepts (in this case entropy and energy) for
their meaning. They are interpretable independently of these
concepts and, further, their validity on the empirical level still
provides the physical content of the theory.
A similar example is provided by special relativity, another
theory of principle, which Einstein deliberately designed
after the ideal of thermodynamics. Here, the empirical
principles are the light postulate and the relativity principle.
Again, once we have built up the modern theoretical
formalism of the theory (the Minkowski space-time) it is
straightforward to prove the validity of these principles. But
again this does not count as an argument for claiming that
they were no principles after all. So the question whether the
term ‘principle’ is justified for Heisenberg's relations, should,
in our view, be understood as the question whether they are
conceived of as empirical principles.

One can easily show that this idea was never far from
Heisenberg's intentions. We have already seen that
Heisenberg presented the relations as the result of a "pure
fact of experience". A few months after his 1927 paper, he
wrote a popular paper with the title "Ueber die
Grundprincipien der Quantenmechanik" ("On the
fundamental principles of quantum mechanics") where he
made the point even more clearly. Here Heisenberg described
his recent break-through in the interpretation of the theory as
follows: "It seems to be a general law of nature that we
cannot determine position and velocity simultaneously with
arbitrary accuracy". Now actually, and in spite of its title, the
paper does not identify or discuss any ‘fundamental
principle’ of quantum mechanics. So, it must have seemed
obvious to his readers that he intended to claim that the
uncertainty relation was a fundamental principle, forced upon
us as an empirical law of nature, rather than a result derived
from the formalism of the theory.
This reading of Heisenberg's intentions is corroborated by the
fact that, even in his 1927 paper, applications of his relation
frequently present the conclusion as a matter of principle. For
example, he says "In a stationary state of an atom its phase is
in principle indeterminate" (Heisenberg, 1927, p. 177,
[emphasis added]). Similarly, in a paper of 1928, he
described the content of his relations as: "It has turned out
that it is in principle impossible to know, to measure the
position and velocity of a piece of matter with arbitrary
accuracy. (Heisenberg, 1984, p. 26, [emphasis added])"

So, although Heisenberg did not originate the tradition of
calling his relations a principle, it is not implausible to
attribute the view to him that the uncertainty relations
represent an empirical principle that could serve as a
foundation of quantum mechanics. In fact, his 1927 paper
expressed this desire explicitly: "Surely, one would like to be
able to deduce the quantitative laws of quantum mechanics
directly from their anschaulich foundations, that is,
essentially, relation [(2)]" (ibid, p. 196). This is not to say
that Heisenberg was successful in reaching this goal, or that
he did not express other opinions on other occasions.
Let us conclude this section with three remarks. First, if the
uncertainty relation is to serve as an empirical principle, one
might well ask what its direct empirical support is. In
Heisenberg's analysis, no such support is mentioned. His
arguments concerned thought experiments in which the
validity of the theory, at least at a rudimentary level, is
implicitly taken for granted. Jammer (1974, p. 82) conducted
a literature search for high precision experiments that could
seriously test the uncertainty relations and concluded they
were still scarce in 1974. Real experimental support for the
uncertainty relations in experiments in which the inaccuracies
are close to the quantum limit have come about only more
recently. (See Kaiser, Werner and George 1983, Uffink 1985,
Nairz, Andt, and Zeilinger, 2001.)
A second point is the question whether the theoretical
structure or the quantitative laws of quantum theory can
indeed be derived on the basis of the uncertainty principle, as
Heisenberg wished. Serious attempts to build up quantum

theory as a full-fledged Theory of Principle on the basis of
the uncertainty principle have never been carried out. Indeed,
the most Heisenberg could and did claim in this respect was
that the uncertainty relations created "room" (Heisenberg
1927, p. 180) or "freedom" (Heisenberg, 1931, p. 43) for the
introduction of some non-classical mode of description of
experimental data, not that they uniquely lead to the
formalism of quantum mechanics. A serious proposal to
construe quantum mechanics as a theory of principle was
provided only recently by Bub (2000). But, remarkably, this
proposal does not use the uncertainty relation as one of its
fundamental principles.
Third, it is remarkable that in his later years Heisenberg put a
somewhat different gloss on his relations. In his
autobiography Der Teil und das Ganze of 1969 he described
how he had found his relations inspired by a remark by
Einstein that "it is the theory which decides what one can
observe" -- thus giving precedence to theory above
experience, rather than the other way around. Some years
later he even admitted that his famous discussions of thought
experiments were actually trivial since "… if the process of
observation itself is subject to the laws of quantum theory, it
must be possible to represent its result in the mathematical
scheme of this theory.
2.5 Mathematical elaboration
When Heisenberg introduced his relation, his argument was
based only on qualitative examples. He did not provide a
general, exact derivation of his relations. Indeed, he did not
even give a definition of the uncertainties δq, etc., occurring

in these relations. Of course, this was consistent with the
announced goal of that paper, i.e. to provide some qualitative
understanding of quantum mechanics for simple experiments.
The first mathematically exact formulation of the uncertainty
relations is due to Kennard. He proved in 1927 the theorem
that for all normalized state vectors |ψ> the following
inequality holds:
Δψp Δψq ≥ /2

(9)

Here, Δψp and Δψq are standard deviations of position and
momentum in the state vector |ψ>, i.e.,
(Δψp)² = <p²>ψ − (<p>ψ)²,

(Δψq)² = <q²>ψ − (<q>ψ)². (10)

where <·>ψ = <ψ|·|ψ> denotes the expectation value in state
|ψ>. The inequality (9) was generalized in 1929 by Robertson
who proved that for all observables (self-adjoint operators) A
and B
ΔψA ΔψB ≥ ½|<[A,B]> ψ|

(11)

where [A, B] := AB − BA denotes the commutator. This
relation was in turn strengthened by Schrödinger (1930), who
obtained:
(ΔψA)² (ΔψB)² ≥
¼|<[A,B]> ψ|² + ¼|<{A−<A> ψ, B−<B> ψ}>ψ|²

(12)

where {A, B} := (AB + BA) denotes the anti-commutator.

Since the above inequalities have the virtue of being exact
and general, in contrast to Heisenberg's original semiquantitative formulation, it is tempting to regard them as the
exact counterpart of Heisenberg's relations (2)-(4). Indeed,
such was Heisenberg's own view. In his Chicago Lectures
(Heisenberg 1930, pp. 15-19), he presented Kennard's
derivation of relation (9) and claimed that "this proof does
not differ at all in mathematical content" from the semiquantitative argument he had presented earlier, the only
difference being that now "the proof is carried through
exactly".
But it may be useful to point out that both in status and
intended role there is a difference between Kennard's
inequality and Heisenberg's previous formulation (2). The
inequalities discussed in the present section are not
statements of empirical fact, but theorems of the quantum
mechanical formalism. As such, they presuppose the validity
of this formalism, and in particular the commutation relation
(1), rather than elucidating its intuitive content or to create
‘room’ or ‘freedom’ for the validity of this relation. At best,
one should see the above inequalities as showing that the
formalism is consistent with Heisenberg's empirical
principle.
This situation is similar to that arising in other theories of
principle where, as noted in, one often finds that, next to an
empirical principle, the formalism also provides a
corresponding theorem. And similarly, this situation should
not, by itself, cast doubt on the question whether

Heisenberg's relation can be regarded as a principle of
quantum mechanics.
There is a second notable difference between (2) and (9).
Heisenberg did not give a general definition for the
‘uncertainties’ δp and δq. The most definite remark he made
about them was that they could be taken as "something like
the mean error". In the discussions of thought experiments,
he and Bohr would always quantify uncertainties on a caseto-case basis by choosing some parameters which happened
to be relevant to the experiment at hand. By contrast, the
inequalities (9)-(12) employ a single specific expression as a
measure for ‘uncertainty’: the standard deviation. At the
time, this choice was not unnatural, given that this expression
is well-known and widely used in error theory and the
description of statistical fluctuations. However, there was
very little or no discussion of whether this choice was
appropriate for a general formulation of the uncertainty
relations. A standard deviation reflects the spread or expected
fluctuations in a series of measurements of an observable in a
given state. It is not at all easy to connect this idea with the
concept of the ‘inaccuracy’ of a measurement, such as the
resolving power of a microscope. In fact, even though
Heisenberg had taken Kennard's inequality as the precise
formulation of the uncertainty relation, he and Bohr never
relied on standard deviations in their many discussions of
thought experiments, and indeed, it has been shown (Uffink
and Hilgevoord, 1985; Hilgevoord and Uffink, 1988) that
these discussions cannot be framed in terms of standard
deviation.

Another problem with the above elaboration is that the ‘wellknown’ relations (5) are actually false if energy E and action
J are to be positive operators (Jordan 1927). In that case, selfadjoint operators t and w do not exist and inequalities
analogous to (9) cannot be derived. Also, these inequalities
do not hold for angle and angular momentum (Uffink 1990).
These obstacles have led to a quite extensive literature on
time-energy and angle-action uncertainty relations (Muga et
al. 2002, Hilgevoord 2005).
3. Bohr
In spite of the fact that Heisenberg's and Bohr's views on
quantum mechanics are often lumped together as (part of)
‘the Copenhagen interpretation’, there is considerable
difference between their views on the uncertainty relations.
3.1 From wave-particle duality to complementarity
Long before the development of modern quantum mechanics,
Bohr had been particularly concerned with the problem of
particle-wave duality, i.e. the problem that experimental
evidence on the behaviour of both light and matter seemed to
demand a wave picture in some cases, and a particle picture
in others. Yet these pictures are mutually exclusive. Whereas
a particle is always localized, the very definition of the
notions of wavelength and frequency requires an extension in
space and in time. Moreover, the classical particle picture is
incompatible with the characteristic phenomenon of
interference.

His long struggle with wave-particle duality had prepared
him for a radical step when the dispute between matrix and
wave mechanics broke out in 1926-27. For the main
contestants, Heisenberg and Schrödinger, the issue at stake
was which view could claim to provide a single coherent and
universal framework for the description of the observational
data. The choice was, essentially between a description in
terms of continuously evolving waves, or else one of
particles undergoing discontinuous quantum jumps. By
contrast, Bohr insisted that elements from both views were
equally valid and equally needed for an exhaustive
description of the data. His way out of the contradiction was
to renounce the idea that the pictures refer, in a literal one-toone correspondence, to physical reality. Instead, the
applicability of these pictures was to become dependent on
the experimental context. This is the gist of the viewpoint he
called ‘complementarity’.
Bohr first conceived the general outline of his
complementarity argument in early 1927, during a skiing
holiday in Norway, at the same time when Heisenberg wrote
his uncertainty paper. When he returned to Copenhagen and
found Heisenberg's manuscript, they got into an intense
discussion. On the one hand, Bohr was quite enthusiastic
about Heisenberg's ideas which seemed to fit wonderfully
with his own thinking. Indeed, in his subsequent work, Bohr
always presented the uncertainty relations as the symbolic
expression of his complementarity viewpoint. On the other
hand, he criticized Heisenberg severely for his suggestion
that these relations were due to discontinuous changes
occurring during a measurement process. Rather, Bohr

argued, their proper derivation should start from the
indispensability of both particle and wave concepts. He
pointed out that the uncertainties in the experiment did not
exclusively arise from the discontinuities but also from the
fact that in the experiment we need to take into account both
the particle theory and the wave theory. It is not so much the
unknown disturbance which renders the momentum of the
electron uncertain but rather the fact that the position and the
momentum of the electron cannot be simultaneously defined
in this experiment. (See the "Addition in Proof" to
Heisenberg's paper.)
We shall not go too deeply into the matter of Bohr's
interpretation of quantum mechanics since we are mostly
interested in Bohr's view on the uncertainty principle. For a
more detailed discussion of Bohr's philosophy of quantum
physics we refer to Scheibe (1973), Folse (1985), Honner
(1987) and Murdoch (1987). It may be useful, however, to
sketch some of the main points. Central in Bohr's
considerations is the language we use in physics. No matter
how abstract and subtle the concepts of modern physics may
be, they are essentially an extension of our ordinary language
and a means to communicate the results of our experiments.
These results, obtained under well-defined experimental
circumstances, are what Bohr calls the "phenomena". A
phenomenon is "the comprehension of the effects observed
under given experimental conditions" (Bohr 1939, p. 24), it is
the resultant of a physical object, a measuring apparatus and
the interaction between them in a concrete experimental
situation. The essential difference between classical and
quantum physics is that in quantum physics the interaction

between the object and the apparatus cannot be made
arbitrarily small; the interaction must at least comprise one
quantum. This is expressed by Bohr's quantum postulate:
[… the] essence [of the formulation of the quantum theory]
may be expressed in the so-called quantum postulate, which
attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity or
rather individuality, completely foreign to classical theories
and symbolized by Planck's quantum of action. (Bohr, 1928,
p. 580)
A phenomenon, therefore, is an indivisible whole and the
result of a measurement cannot be considered as an
autonomous manifestation of the object itself independently
of the measurement context. The quantum postulate forces
upon us a new way of describing physical phenomena:
In this situation, we are faced with the necessity of a radical
revision of the foundation for the description and explanation
of physical phenomena. Here, it must above all be recognized
that, however far quantum effects transcend the scope of
classical physical analysis, the account of the experimental
arrangement and the record of the observations must always
be expressed in common language supplemented with the
terminology of classical physics. (Bohr, 1948, p. 313)
This is what Scheibe (1973) has called the "buffer postulate"
because it prevents the quantum from penetrating into the
classical description: A phenomenon must always be
described in classical terms; Planck's constant does not occur
in this description.

Together, the two postulates induce the following reasoning.
In every phenomenon the interaction between the object and
the apparatus comprises at least one quantum. But the
description of the phenomenon must use classical notions in
which the quantum of action does not occur. Hence, the
interaction cannot be analysed in this description. On the
other hand, the classical character of the description allows to
speak in terms of the object itself. Instead of saying: ‘the
interaction between a particle and a photographic plate has
resulted in a black spot in a certain place on the plate’, we are
allowed to forgo mentioning the apparatus and say: ‘the
particle has been found in this place’. The experimental
context, rather than changing or disturbing pre-existing
properties of the object, defines what can meaningfully be
said about the object.
Because the interaction between object and apparatus is left
out in our description of the phenomenon, we do not get the
whole picture. Yet, any attempt to extend our description by
performing the measurement of a different observable
quantity of the object, or indeed, on the measurement
apparatus, produces a new phenomenon and we are again
confronted with the same situation. Because of the
unanalyzable interaction in both measurements, the two
descriptions cannot, generally, be united into a single picture.
They are what Bohr calls complementary descriptions:
[the quantum of action]...forces us to adopt a new mode of
description designated as complementary in the sense that
any given application of classical concepts precludes the
simultaneous use of other classical concepts which in a

different connection are equally necessary for the elucidation
of the phenomena. (Bohr, 1929, p. 10)
The most important example of complementary descriptions
is provided by the measurements of the position and
momentum of an object. If one wants to measure the position
of the object relative to a given spatial frame of reference, the
measuring instrument must be rigidly fixed to the bodies
which define the frame of reference. But this implies the
impossibility of investigating the exchange of momentum
between the object and the instrument and we are cut off
from obtaining any information about the momentum of the
object. If, on the other hand, one wants to measure the
momentum of an object the measuring instrument must be
able to move relative to the spatial reference frame. Bohr
here assumes that a momentum measurement involves the
registration of the recoil of some movable part of the
instrument and the use of the law of momentum
conservation. The looseness of the part of the instrument with
which the object interacts entails that the instrument cannot
serve to accurately determine the position of the object. Since
a measuring instrument cannot be rigidly fixed to the spatial
reference frame and, at the same time, be movable relative to
it, the experiments which serve to precisely determine the
position and the momentum of an object are mutually
exclusive. Of course, in itself, this is not at all typical for
quantum mechanics. But, because the interaction between
object and instrument during the measurement can neither be
neglected nor determined the two measurements cannot be
combined. This means that in the description of the object

one must choose between the assignment of a precise
position or of a precise momentum.
Similar considerations hold with respect to the measurement
of time and energy. Just as the spatial coordinate system must
be fixed by means of solid bodies so must the time coordinate
be fixed by means of unperturbable, synchronised clocks. But
it is precisely this requirement which prevents one from
taking into account of the exchange of energy with the
instrument if this is to serve its purpose. Conversely, any
conclusion about the object based on the conservation of
energy prevents following its development in time.
The conclusion is that in quantum mechanics we are
confronted with a complementarity between two descriptions
which are united in the classical mode of description: the
space-time description (or coordination) of a process and the
description based on the applicability of the dynamical
conservation laws. The quantum forces us to give up the
classical mode of description (also called the ‘causal’ mode
of description by Bohr): it is impossible to form a classical
picture of what is going on when radiation interacts with
matter as, e.g., in the Compton effect.
Any arrangement suited to study the exchange of energy and
momentum between the electron and the photon must involve
a latitude in the space-time description sufficient for the
definition of wave-number and frequency which enter in the
relation [E = hν and p = hσ]. Conversely, any attempt of
locating the collision between the photon and the electron
more accurately would, on account of the unavoidable
interaction with the fixed scales and clocks defining the

space-time reference frame, exclude all closer account as
regards the balance of momentum and energy. (Bohr, 1949,
p. 210)
A causal description of the process cannot be attained; we
have to content ourselves with complementary descriptions.
"The viewpoint of complementarity may be regarded",
according to Bohr, "as a rational generalization of the very
ideal of causality".
In addition to complementary descriptions Bohr also talks
about complementary phenomena and complementary
quantities. Position and momentum, as well as time and
energy, are complementary quantities.
We have seen that Bohr's approach to quantum theory puts
heavy emphasis on the language used to communicate
experimental observations, which, in his opinion, must
always remain classical. By comparison, he seemed to put
little value on arguments starting from the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory. This informal approach is
typical of all of Bohr's discussions on the meaning of
quantum mechanics. One might say that for Bohr the
conceptual clarification of the situation has primary
importance while the formalism is only a symbolic
representation of this situation.
This is remarkable since, finally, it is the formalism which
needs to be interpreted. This neglect of the formalism is one
of the reasons why it is so difficult to get a clear
understanding of Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics
and why it has aroused so much controversy. We close this

section by citing from an article of 1948 to show how Bohr
conceived the role of the formalism of quantum mechanics:
The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving
predictions, of definite or statistical character, as regards
information obtainable under experimental conditions
described in classical terms and specified by means of
parameters entering into the algebraic or differential
equations of which the matrices or the wave-functions,
respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is
indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not
susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real
functions like densities and currents are only to be regarded
as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of
individual events observable under well-defined experimental
conditions. (Bohr, 1948, p. 314)
3.2 Bohr's view on the uncertainty relations
In his Como lecture, published in 1928, Bohr gave his own
version of a derivation of the uncertainty relations between
position and momentum and between time and energy. He
started from the relations
E = hν and p = h/λ

(13)

which connect the notions of energy E and momentum p
from the particle picture with those of frequency ν and
wavelength λ from the wave picture. He noticed that a wave
packet of limited extension in space and time can only be
built up by the superposition of a number of elementary
waves with a large range of wave numbers and frequencies.

Denoting the spatial and temporal extensions of the wave
packet by Δx and Δt, and the extensions in the wave number
σ := 1/λ and frequency by Δσ and Δν, it follows from Fourier
analysis that in the most favorable case Δx Δσ ≈ Δt Δν ≈ 1,
and, using (13), one obtains the relations
Δt ΔE ≈ Δx Δp ≈ h

(14)

Note that Δx, Δσ, etc., are not standard deviations but
unspecified measures of the size of a wave packet. (The
original text has equality signs instead of approximate
equality signs, but, since Bohr does not define the spreads
exactly the use of approximate equality signs seems more in
line with his intentions. Moreover, Bohr himself used
approximate equality signs in later presentations.) These
equations determine, according to Bohr: "the highest possible
accuracy in the definition of the energy and momentum of
the individuals associated with the wave field" (Bohr 1928, p.
571). He noted, "This circumstance may be regarded as a
simple symbolic expression of the complementary nature of
the space-time description and the claims of causality"
(ibid).[6] We note a few points about Bohr's view on the
uncertainty relations. First of all, Bohr does not refer to
discontinuous changes in the relevant quantities during the
measurement process. Rather, he emphasizes the possibility
of defining these quantities. This view is markedly different
from Heisenberg's. A draft version of the Como lecture is
even more explicit on the difference between Bohr and
Heisenberg:

These reciprocal uncertainty relations were given in a recent
paper of Heisenberg as the expression of the statistical
element which, due to the feature of discontinuity implied in
the quantum postulate, characterizes any interpretation of
observations by means of classical concepts. It must be
remembered, however, that the uncertainty in question is not
simply a consequence of a discontinuous change of energy
and momentum say during an interaction between radiation
and material particles employed in measuring the space-time
coordinates of the individuals. According to the above
considerations the question is rather that of the impossibility
of defining rigourously such a change when the space-time
coordination of the individuals is also considered. (Bohr,
1985 p. 93)
Indeed, Bohr not only rejected Heisenberg's argument that
these relations are due to discontinuous disturbances implied
by the act of measuring, but also his view that the
measurement process creates a definite result:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we
are confronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest
caution as regard all questions of terminology. Speaking, as it
is often done of disturbing a phenomenon by observation, or
even of creating physical attributes to objects by measuring
processes is liable to be confusing, since all such sentences
imply a departure from conventions of basic language which
even though it can be practical for the sake of brevity, can
never be unambiguous. (Bohr, 1939, p. 24)
Nor did he approve of an epistemological formulation or one
in terms of experimental inaccuracies:

[…] a sentence like "we cannot know both the momentum
and the position of an atomic object" raises at once questions
as to the physical reality of two such attributes of the object,
which can be answered only by referring to the mutual
exclusive conditions for an unambiguous use of space-time
concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical conservation laws
on the other hand. (Bohr, 1948, p. 315; also Bohr 1949, p.
211)
It would in particular not be out of place in this connection to
warn against a misunderstanding likely to arise when one
tries to express the content of Heisenberg's well-known
indeterminacy relation by such a statement as ‘the position
and momentum of a particle cannot simultaneously be
measured with arbitrary accuracy’. According to such a
formulation it would appear as though we had to do with
some arbitrary renunciation of the measurement of either the
one or the other of two well-defined attributes of the object,
which would not preclude the possibility of a future theory
taking both attributes into account on the lines of the classical
physics. (Bohr 1937, p. 292)
Instead, Bohr always stressed that the uncertainty relations
are first and foremost an expression of complementarity. This
may seem odd since complementarity is a dichotomic
relation between two types of description whereas the
uncertainty relations allow for intermediate situations
between two extremes. They "express" the dichotomy in the
sense that if we take the energy and momentum to be
perfectly well-defined, symbolically ΔE = Δp = 0, the postion
and time variables are completely undefined, Δx = Δt = ∞,

and vice versa. But they also allow intermediate situations in
which the mentioned uncertainties are all non-zero and finite.
This more positive aspect of the uncertainty relation is
mentioned in the Como lecture:
At the same time, however, the general character of this
relation makes it possible to a certain extent to reconcile the
conservation laws with the space-time coordination of
observations, the idea of a coincidence of well-defined events
in space-time points being replaced by that of unsharply
defined individuals within space-time regions. (Bohr 1928, p.
571)
However, Bohr never followed up on this suggestion that we
might be able to strike a compromise between the two
mutually exclusive modes of description in terms of
unsharply defined quantities. Indeed, an attempt to do so,
would take the formalism of quantum theory more seriously
than the concepts of classical language, and this step Bohr
refused to take. Instead, in his later writings he would be
content with stating that the uncertainty relations simply defy
an unambiguous interpretation in classical terms:
These so-called indeterminacy relations explicitly bear out
the limitation of causal analysis, but it is important to
recognize that no unambiguous interpretation of such a
relation can be given in words suited to describe a situation in
which physical attributes are objectified in a classical way.
(Bohr, 1948, p.315)
It must here be remembered that even in the indeterminacy
relation [Δq Δp ≈ h] we are dealing with an implication of the

formalism which defies unambiguous expression in words
suited to describe classical pictures. Thus a sentence like "we
cannot know both the momentum and the position of an
atomic object" raises at once questions as to the physical
reality of two such attributes of the object, which can be
answered only by referring to the conditions for an
unambiguous use of space-time concepts, on the one hand,
and dynamical conservation laws on the other hand. (Bohr,
1949, p. 211)
Finally, on a more formal level, we note that Bohr's
derivation does not rely on the commutation relations (1) and
(5), but on Fourier analysis. These two approaches are
equivalent as far as the relationship between position and
momentum is concerned, but this is not so for time and
energy since most physical systems do not have a time
operator. Indeed, in his discussion with Einstein (Bohr,
1949), Bohr considered time as a simple classical variable.
This even holds for his famous discussion of the ‘clock-inthe-box’ thought-experiment where the time, as defined by
the clock in the box, is treated from the point of view of
classical general relativity. Thus, in an approach based on
commutation relations, the position-momentum and timeenergy uncertainty relations are not on equal footing, which
is contrary to Bohr's approach in terms of Fourier analysis
(Hilgevoord 1996 and 1998).
4. The Minimal Interpretation
In the previous two sections we have seen how both
Heisenberg and Bohr attributed a far-reaching status to the
uncertainty relations. They both argued that these relations

place fundamental limits on the applicability of the usual
classical concepts. Moreover, they both believed that these
limitations were inevitable and forced upon us. However, we
have also seen that they reached such conclusions by starting
from radical and controversial assumptions. This entails, of
course, that their radical conclusions remain unconvincing
for those who reject these assumptions. Indeed, the
operationalist-positivist viewpoint adopted by these authors
has long since lost its appeal among philosophers of physics.
So the question may be asked what alternative views of the
uncertainty relations are still viable. Of course, this problem
is intimately connected with that of the interpretation of the
wave function, and hence of quantum mechanics as a whole.
Since there is no consensus about the latter, one cannot
expect consensus about the interpretation of the uncertainty
relations either. Here we only describe a point of view, which
we call the ‘minimal interpretation’, that seems to be shared
by both the adherents of the Copenhagen interpretation and
of other views.
In quantum mechanics a system is supposed to be described
by its quantum state, also called its state vector. Given the
state vector, one can derive probability distributions for all
the physical quantities pertaining to the system such as its
position, momentum, angular momentum, energy, etc. The
operational meaning of these probability distributions is that
they correspond to the distribution of the values obtained for
these quantities in a long series of repetitions of the
measurement. More precisely, one imagines a great number
of copies of the system under consideration, all prepared in

the same way. On each copy the momentum, say, is
measured. Generally, the outcomes of these measurements
differ and a distribution of outcomes is obtained. The
theoretical momentum distribution derived from the quantum
state is supposed to coincide with the hypothetical
distribution of outcomes obtained in an infinite series of
repetitions of the momentum measurement. The same holds,
mutatis mutandis, for all the other physical quantities
pertaining to the system. Note that no simultaneous
measurements of two or more quantities are required in
defining the operational meaning of the probability
distributions.
Uncertainty relations can be considered as statements about
the spreads of the probability distributions of the several
physical quantities arising from the same state. For example,
the uncertainty relation between the position and momentum
of a system may be understood as the statement that the
position and momentum distributions cannot both be
arbitrarily narrow -- in some sense of the word "narrow" -- in
any quantum state. Inequality (9) is an example of such a
relation in which the standard deviation is employed as a
measure of spread. From this characterization of uncertainty
relations follows that a more detailed interpretation of the
quantum state than the one given in the previous paragraph is
not required to study uncertainty relations as such. In
particular, a further ontological or linguistic interpretation of
the notion of uncertainty, as limits on the applicability of our
concepts given by Heisenberg or Bohr, need not be supposed.

Indeed, this minimal interpretation leaves open whether it
makes sense to attribute precise values of position and
momentum to an individual system. Some interpretations of
quantum mechanics, e.g. those of Heisenberg and Bohr, deny
this; while others, e.g. the interpretation of de Broglie and
Bohm insist that each individual system has a definite
position and momentum. The only requirement is that, as an
empirical fact, it is not possible to prepare pure ensembles in
which all systems have the same values for these quantities,
or ensembles in which the spreads are smaller than allowed
by quantum theory. Although interpretations of quantum
mechanics, in which each system has a definite value for its
position and momentum are still viable, this is not to say that
they are without strange features of their own; they do not
imply a return to classical physics.
We end with a few remarks on this minimal interpretation.
First, it may be noted that the minimal interpretation of the
uncertainty relations is little more than filling in the empirical
meaning of inequality (9), or an inequality in terms of other
measures of width, as obtained from the standard formalism
of quantum mechanics. As such, this view shares many of the
limitations we have noted above about this inequality.
Indeed, it is not straightforward to relate the spread in a
statistical distribution of measurement results with the
inaccuracy of this measurement, such as, e.g. the resolving
power of a microscope. Moreover, the minimal interpretation
does not address the question whether one can make
simultaneous accurate measurements of position and
momentum. As a matter of fact, one can show that the
standard formalism of quantum mechanics does not allow

such simultaneous measurements. But this is not a
consequence of relation (9).
If one feels that statements about inaccuracy of measurement,
or the possibility of simultaneous measurements, belong to
any satisfactory formulation of the uncertainty principle, the
minimal interpretation may thus be too minimal.

